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GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation contains three papers on the Harris-
Todaro model of labor migration in the developing countries. 
All the papers either have been or will be submitted to 
professional journals for publication. All the papers are 
purely theoretical analyses of commercial policies of a small 
and open country with surplus labor. 
1. Dissertation Organization 
The main body of this dissertation consists of a general 
review of literature, three papers, and a general conclusion, 
in that order. The literature review part gives a more 
detailed history of the development of the Harris-Todaro 
model, the length of which makes it inappropriate to be 
included in any of the papers that follow. 
The first paper discusses some of the properties and the 
trade policy implication of the classical Harris-Todaro model. 
In the second paper, a service sector is added to the original 
structure and its impacts are analyzed. In the third paper, 
the effects of assuming risk aversion on the part of migrant 
workers are examined. 
Finally, a general conclusion summarizes the major 
results of the papers and offers suggestions and possible 
directions for future research on the issue. 
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A LITERATURE REVIEW OF THE HARRIS-TODARO MODEL 
Editors of professional journals in economics usually 
frown upon the presence of a lengthy introduction or 
literature review in submitted articles, as is the case with 
the journals to which the following papers were submitted. 
Therefore, it is only appropriate to include in this 
dissertation this more comprehensive literature survey. The 
first part of this survey is a background introduction of the 
development and modification of the Harris-Todaro model of 
labor migration in the context of development economics. The 
second part attempts to justify using the Harris-Todaro 
framework in the analyses of commercial policies of a small 
and open country with labor surplus. 
1. The Harris-Todaro Model of Labor Migration in the 
Literature of Development Economics 
It has long been realized that in order for an economy to 
develop or grow, a large amount of labor has to be transferred 
from the traditional (or backward) agricultural sector in 
rural areas, where the productivity of labor is low (or 
negligible, or zero, or even negative) to the modern 
manufacturing sector where the productivity of labor is higher 
and rising due to capital accumulation in that sector. 
It should not be surprising, therefore, that, in the 
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literature of development economics, dualistic models gained 
popularity over the single-commodity or single-sector theories 
in the 1950's. A typical dualistic model in development 
economics contains two sectors, a traditional or agricultural 
sector in the rural area and a modern or manufacturing sector 
in the urban area. The most familiar single-sector model is 
the growth theory of Harrod-Domar (Harrod 1939 and 1948, Domar 
1946). The most representative and influential dualistic 
framework is that of Lewis (1954). 
The ideas of surplus labor, subsistence wages, and 
turning points in the development of a dualistic economy in 
Lewis (1954) were later rigorously and diagrammatically 
formalized by Ranis and Fei (1961). Ranis and Fei also showed 
how agricultural surplus could lead to the growth of 
industries. The production relations of a dual economy, 
according to Jorgenson (1961), was characterized by asymmetry. 
More precisely, he assumed that output in the agricultural 
sector was a function of land and labor alone (there is no 
capital accumulation in this sector), and was characterized by 
diminishing return to scale. On the other hand, the output of 
the urban sector depended on capital and labor alone (no land 
was required), and the production function displayed constant 
return to scale. Since the amount of land and capital in the 
economy was assumed fixed, the only problem was to allocate 
labor between the two sectors. 
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The common features of the dualistic theories discussed 
so far and some other models of that nature are that 1). there 
is no unemployment in the modern sector, and 2). the sectoral 
wage differential is assumed fixed or proportional to the wage 
level in the urban sector. These models were later labeled as 
"orthodox" by Corden and Findlay (1971). 
The unorthodox thinking was first and independently 
introduced by several economists, notably among whom were 
Michael Todaro (1969) and John Harris (Harris and Todaro 
1970). The essence of the new thinking, which has to be 
reminiscent of the Keynesian revolution, is that there can be 
an equilibrium with the existence of a chronic large amount of 
urban unemployment. 
By the end of the 1960s, the world had seen the rapid 
growth of urban areas in the developing countries. "From Dar 
es Salaam to Karachi to Caracas, from land surplus to labor 
surplus to capital surplus countries, one hears of the ever-
increasing flow of rural migrants into urban area and of the 
inability of the urban economy to provide permanent jobs for 
even a majority of these workers" (Todaro 1969). For 
instance, between 1950 and 1960, urban areas in Africa grew by 
69%, in Latin America by 67%, and in Asia by 51%, while rural 
areas grew by only 20% over the same period (Fields 1975). 
The most important factor that causes urban population 
explosion has been the migration of labor from the rural areas 
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into the cities throughout the less developed world. 
Population growth also contributes to this phenomenon but in a 
much less scale, since it rarely exceeds 3%. In the context 
of a dualistic model, the rural sector is discharging labor 
too rapidly and the urban sector is hiring labor too slowly 
because it is too highly capital intensive (Lewis 1965). As a 
result, the "urban manifestations of the employment problem" 
becomes the most visible feature of poverty and 
underdevelopment of the Third World countries (Lubell 1988). 
It has been pointed out by many that economic 
considerations, or urban-rural wage differentials, play an 
important role in determining the extent of labor migration. 
The higher than competitive urban wage is due to a combination 
of trade-union pressure, nationalistic government pressure on 
foreign enterprises, and the new social conscience of big 
entrepreneurs (Lewis 1965). Citing the case of increasing gap 
between urban and agricultural earnings in Puerto Rico, 
Reynolds (1965) argues that minimum urban wages are 
politically determined, i.e., through legislation. Harberger 
(1971) distinguishes urban wages into the "protected-sector 
wages" and the "unprotected urban wages." The former is above 
the market-clearing level and is believed to be held high by 
minimum wage laws, by collective bargaining agreements, or by 
the policy of the hiring company itself. In parts of China, 
minimum wages have been set up since 1988 by local governments 
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mainly to prevent joint ventures from exploiting their local 
employees (China Reform Journal 1994). 
More recent studies show that the problem of urban 
unemployment is not unique to the less developed countries 
(LDCs). In 1985, while urban unemployment rates of Botswana 
and Lesotho were as high as 31.2% and 22.3%, respectively, 
Ireland, France, and Italy recorded 17.3%, 10.2%, and 10.3%, 
respectively, higher than some LDCs like India or Pakistan 
(6.8 and 5.0, respectively) (Turnham 1993). In China, where 
the term "unemployment" did not exist in the official 
government documents 10 years ago, among the 400 million 
workers in the countryside, 120-150 million are labelled as 
"potentially unemployed," which has added enormous pressure 
to the urban economy and will undoubtedly continue to do so. 
Regionally, the urban unemployment rates are as high as over 
20% (Wang 1993). 
It was the observation of "a curious economic phenomenon" 
in tropical Africa that led to the pioneering work of Harris 
and Todaro (Todaro 1969; Harris and Todaro 1970). The 
phenomenon was the continual and accelerating rural-urban 
labor migration despite the existence of positive marginal 
products in agriculture. 
Todaro's main contribution is the introduction of the 
probability of employment as an element in the decision making 
process of a potential migrant. He proposed what he called "a 
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more realistic picture of labor migration in less developed 
countries", i.e., a two-stage process. The first stage is 
where the rural migrant enters the urban area and settles down 
in the so called "traditional urban sector" (or more 
popularly, the informal sector) for a certain period of time. 
The second stage is reached when the migrant finds a more 
permanent job in the modern sector. Note that Todaro and 
later on some others did not consider the informal urban 
sector explicitly, its employees (usually underemployed) not 
being distinguished from those who are not employed at all. 
They make no income on their own and were supposed to live out 
of the support of their relatives in their origins or in the 
cities (for a vivid description of the informal sector, see 
Lewis (1954)) . 
The probability of landing a job, according to Todaro, 
depends on the number of newly created jobs in the modern 
sector, the size of the population of the urban unemployed, 
and the length of time a migrant has been in the urban area. 
At any time, jobs were allocated as if by lottery. 
Understandably, the longer one has been in the urban area, the 
more likely he will find a job in the manufacturing sector. 
The criterion used in making the decision to migrate or not is 
the expected relative present real values of the two choices. 
An important extension in this direction was done by 
Harris and Todaro (1970), where they formulated the idea that 
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the rural wage is equated to the expected urban wage, into the 
now famous Harris-Todaro equation, or 
where w^ is the flexible wage in the agricultural sector which 
is equated to the value of the marginal product in that 
sector, /3 is the probability of employment, depending on the 
number of newly created jobs and the size of the population of 
the urban unemployed, and w„ is the wage in the manufacturing 
sector and is assumed to be fixed institutionally (either 
because of union activities or a friendly government towards 
to the workers in the modern sector) above the competitive 
level. (Many empirical results showed that (real) wages were 
consistently higher in unionized sectors. (Amacher 1989, 603-
605)) Unlike in the orthodox models, the urban wage, not the 
sectoral wage differential, is assumed to be fixed. 
A very effective illustration of what we will refer to as 
the Harris-Todaro (HT hereafter) model was given by Corden and 
Findlay (1975). Their geometric presentation of the model was 
straightforward and elucidating. The major contribution, 
however, is the introduction of the intersectoral capital 
mobility into the original HT model. They also treated the 
economy as small and open, enabling the prices of the products 
from both sectors to be fixed. It is important to note that 
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the HT model as was in Harris and Todaro (1970) or Corden and 
Findlay (1975) does not assume asyiranetry about the production 
technologies. 
The policy implications of the HT model are 
understandably different from those of the orthodox models. 
When there is a wage differential with no urban unemployment, 
a wage subsidy in the manufacturing sector is clearly the 
first best policy, which restores the output of the modern 
sector to its level under no labor market distortion. With 
urban unemployment, a wage subsidy alone may not be optimal. 
Harris and Todaro (1970) suggested a wage subsidy to the 
manufacturing sector, combined with a restriction on 
migration. A uniform wage subsidy was proposed by Bhagwati 
and Srinivasan (1974) and Corden (1974), but, as pointed out 
by Corden and Findlay (1975) who also found wage subsidies 
were superior to other methods, the financing problem can not 
be ignored. 
Here it is worth giving more attention to the work of 
Corden and Findlay (1975) since it is from their framework 
where we extend the line of research. Given sectoral capital 
mobility and small country assumptions, and using the net 
change in the value of total outputs as criterion, they also 
concluded that output subsidies, especially a subsidy on the 
manufactures, were even less desirable than wage subsidies. A 
output subsidy on the agricultural sector, they noted, could 
10 
be beneficial if capital is sector specific. A tariff on 
imports of manufactures, which raises the urban output but 
lowers the agricultural output and is equivalent to a subsidy 
to the manufacturing sector financed by taxing the 
agricultural sector, was considered undesirable since it may 
cause other distortions (eg. distortion in consumption). We 
will compare our results with CP's in the first paper of this 
dissertation where we consider production subsidy and tariff 
simultaneously and use utility maximization as criterion in 
evaluating policy or policy combinations. 
Despite its popularity among economists, some of the 
assumptions of the HT model have been subjected to criticism 
and gone under revision ever since it was developed. (For 
instance, see Stiglitz 1974, Lapan 1976, Yap 1977, Montgomery 
1985, Cole and Sanders 1985, etc.) The main critiques are 
summarized by Williamson (1988) as: 
1. The lottery style job allocation excludes investment 
in job search on the part of the immigrants; 
2. The informal sector is not explicitly modelled; 
3. There is not enough evidence to support the 
assumption of a rigid wage in the modern sector. 
Moreover, besides trade union pressure or minimum 
wage legislation, the wage differentials among 
sectors could be explained as well by, say, firm-
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specific training costs; 
4. The issue of discount rates and rational migrants is 
ignored; 
5. The influence on decision making of risk and risk 
attitudes on the part of the potential immigrants is 
not included; and 
6. Differentials in skill levels among the migrants are 
not accounted for. 
It is of greater interest to us to note that Corden and 
Findlay (1975) touched upon the issues of workers being risk 
averse and the handling of the urban informal sector (they 
referred to it as the urban service sector). A modified 
Harris-Todaro equation was proposed to allow for the 
consideration of risk attitude. The equation took the 
following form: 
w„ = w,, 
where w, = crjSw^ is the expected urban wage and 0 s a s 1 was 
the measurement of risk aversion. The immediate implication 
of incorporating risk aversion into the HT model is a higher 
urban employment rate (jS) . We will later express this idea in 
terms of utility functions. It is worth mentioning the two 
special cases imbedded in the above equation. If a = 1, or if 
workers are risk neutral, it reduces to the original HT model; 
if a = 0, or the expected wage is zero, either because 
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manufacturing jobs are not available to the unemployed or 
workers are extremely risk averse, it becomes the orthodox 
wage differential model where there is no unemployment in the 
urban area. Therefore, wage subsidies are more effective when 
a is lower than when it is higher. 
The importance of the urban informal sector can be seen 
from the data reflecting the proportion of urban labor force 
employed in that sector for different LDC cities: Calcutta, 43 
percent; Bogota, 45 percent; Lagos, 50 percent; Mexico City, 
34 percent. It is now well recognized that an informal sector 
exists and is growing in many other LDC cities largely because 
of rural-urban migration (Cole and Sanders 1985). 
To replace the zero productivity unemployment pool with a 
low productivity service sector, Corden and Findlay (CD 
hereafter) (1975) suggested a constant and positive service 
wage for all the non-manufacturing workers. In other words, 
there is no urban unemployment anymore. As pointed out by 
Corden and Findlay, the constant wage assumption is very easy 
to handle. It should be pointed out that the constant service 
wage assumption makes CD's three-sector model no different 
from the original HT model as far as the properties of model 
and its policy implications are concerned. To see this, one 
only needs to examine and compare the HT condition for the two 
models. CD's assumption would lead to the following HT 
condition: 
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w = |3w+ {l-/3)e, 
where e is the constant and positive service wage. The above 
can be written as 
w' = jSw , 
where w' = w - e, and W = W - e. Mathematically, it is 
exactly the same as in the HT model. 
On the other hand, Chao and Yu (1990) assumed a flexible 
wage for the service sector in their work with a three-sector 
HT model. Thus, as in CD, no attempt was tried to distinguish 
between the jobless and the service-employed workers. It may 
look simplistic, but it is actually a very realistic 
assumption for many of the LDCs. We will discuss this matter 
later in the dissertation. 
The most important critique to the HT model, as noted by 
Williamson (1988), is the failure to address the relationship 
between risk and migration, which was discussed by Stark and 
Levhari (1982), Karz and Stark (1986), etc. These authors 
discussed production and employment risk (due to natural 
disasters, for instance), which exacerbates poverty and misery 
in the rural sector and is considered an incentive for 
migration. Thus risk aversion on the part of the potential 
immigrants will raise the urban unemployment. In this 
dissertation, we will adopt a very different approach 
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regarding risk and risk aversion. In other words, we will 
consider the employment risk in the urban area and discuss its 
effect on the urban employment rate and the optimal commercial 
policies. 
2. Commercial policies for a Harris-Todaro Economy 
The purpose of the first three articles is to evaluate 
and compare commercial policies adopted by some of the LDCs. 
In other words, we find ourselves engaged in the debate of the 
superiority of the outward-oriented vs the inward-oriented 
strategies. We will do so for an HT type economy which, we 
believe, describes the situations in many LDCs in the modern 
world. 
It is by now a generally accepted belief that outward (or 
export) oriented development strategies are superior to the 
inward looking (or import substitution) strategies. The often 
cited examples are the successful east Asian countries of 
Taiwan, Korea, and Singapore, and the not so successful 
countries like India, Brazil, Chili, and several other Latin 
American countries. 
It is argued (Balassa 1989) that the import substitution 
policies in many LDCs are biased against the primary (or 
agricultural) sector which happens to be the export sector, 
while export oriented polices provide similar incentives to 
both sectors. In countries that practice inward looking 
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strategies, the limitation of the domestic markets and the 
lack of competition led to allocative and technological 
inefficiency. On the contrary, outward looking countries are 
able to mobilize domestic resources effectively in the 
production of goods that have to be competitive in the vast 
world markets, which in turn allows the exploitation of the 
economies of scale and technological improvement. As a 
result, total factor productivity increased at annual rates of 
over 3 percent in some outward-oriented LDCs while in some of 
the inward-oriented LDCs increases were less than 1 percent or 
even negative. 
Given the post war experiences of development of the 
Third World, proponents of the inward-oriented strategies have 
become less staunch. The most effective argument for the 
policies remains that of the infant industry (Bruton 1989). 
It is believed that even in this situation, protection should 
be only a short run policy. It should also be noted that 
production subsidy is superior to import protection to achieve 
the infant industry objectives. 
It is in our opinion that many LDCs have entered or are 
approaching what was described as the "take off" stage by 
Lewis (1954) and Fei and Ranis (1961), characterized by the 
rapidly growing industries, continual and sizable transfer of 
labor force from the traditional rural sector, and persistent 
problems of high urban unemployment and underemployment rates. 
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In the traditional sector, however, labor surplus is no longer 
a prominent phenomenon and labor productivities have improved, 
partly due to technological investment taken place in that 
sector. As Harberger (1971) points out, "data seem to 
contradict the idea that great masses of labour can be 
withdrawn from the agrarian sector without a palpable loss in 
product." 
The above discussion justifies the policy analyses set in 
an HT framework later on in this dissertation. The distinct 
and common feature of the two or three articles that follow is 
that an indirect utility function and its maximization is used 
to evaluate a policy or policy combination (production 
subsidies and import tariff on manufactured goods). We are 
aware of the critiques to the HT model (Williamson 1988) and 
fully appreciate some of the extensionary works (e.g. Fields 
1975). We will address the two most important critiques to 
the original HT model, namely, the absence of the traditional 
urban sector and the failure to include risk attitude on the 
part of the potential migrants and its influence on the 
migration decision. 
We are also aware of the fact that the first best 
policies to correct a labor market distortion caused by 
minimum wages are wage subsidies or packages that include wage 
subsidies (Harris and Todaro (1970), Bhagawati and Srivansan 
(1974), etc.). In practice, however, wage subsidies are often 
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politically and financially infeasible (Corden and Findlay 
1975). Therefore, in this dissertation, we will focus on the 
second or even third best policies that are more practical and 
are actually employed in many LDCs, namely, production taxes 
(or subsidies) and, more importantly to us, import tariffs 
that are almost ubiquitous. 
As mentioned earlier, the criterion used in policy 
evaluation is the maximization of the social utility function. 
The social utility is derived by either the inclusion of the 
societal income in the utility function or the summation of 
all the individual's utility giving equal weight to each and 
every member of the society. We will also assume that capital 
income is evenly distributed among the agents of the economy. 
Labor income, however, differs among them. Therefore, the 
income level of an individual depends on whether and where the 
individual is employed. Therefore, a worker employed in the 
urban manufacturing sector earns more than a worker employed 
in the agricultural sector who earns more than an unemployed 
person. 
It should be noted that all the wage incomes are in real 
terms because in this dissertation throughout, we will use the 
agricultural output as numeraire. In Harris and Todaro 
(1970), the urban output served as numeraire. 
The first paper of the dissertation discusses some of the 
properties and optimal commercial policies in the HT model a 
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la Corden and Findlay (1975), i.e., it is a small and open 
economy, with two inputs, capital and labor, both employed in 
both sectors. Capital is assumed to flow freely 
intersectorally. We find that in this two-sector-two-input 
model, an HT economy should tax its import competing 
manufacturing sector or subsidize its agricultural sector and 
no import tariff should be levied on the imports of 
manufactured goods. 
In the second paper, the urban traditional sector (we 
name it the service sector) is included for the similar policy 
analyses. We differ from the literature (eg., Chao and Yu 
1990) in applying Jorgenson's notion of asymmetry into the 
structure, by assuming that the production in the service 
sector involves only labor. Following Chao and Yu (1992), we 
also assume that the service wage is flexible. The 
implication of this assumptions is discussed in more detail 
later. 
With this three-sector model, we hope that we can explain 
the expanding gap between the prices of the service sector in 
the LDCs and the industrialized countries. One of the policy 
implications of the inclusion of a third sector is that the 
optimal tariff can be positive under certain situations. 
Risk and risk aversion has not received the attention it 
deserves. Works by Stark and Levhari (1982) and Kats and 
Stark (1986) deal with the risk involved in the rural sector. 
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Understandably this sort of risk and risk aversion 
(diversification) is a further incentive for rural-urban 
migration. The data, however, seem not to support this 
reasoning. Fields (1975) reported that the real urban 
unemployment rates were lower than what the HT model would 
predict. 
In the third paper, we consider the risk of unemployment 
in the urban sector and risk aversion on the part of the job-
seekers. It is clear that employment risk and risk aversion 
should deter migration and the urban unemployment rates so 
predicted should be closer to what was reported. An 
interesting result is that the optimal tariff is necessarily 
positive if the job-seekers are risk averse and no production 
subsidy is used. 
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TRADE POLICIES AND WELFARE IN A HARRIS-TODARO ECONOMY 
A paper submitted to Southern Economic Journal 
Jiong Chen 
Abstract 
This paper investigates optimal trade policies of a small 
open Harris-Todaro (HT) economy with urban unemployment and 
intersectoral capital mobility. An import tariff is shown to 
be welfare-reducing in an HT economy. However, if an optimal 
production subsidy, which is negative, is used, the optimal 
tariff is zero. In the absence of a production subsidy, the 
optimal tariff is negative. This implies that a reduction of 
tariff implemented by a free trade agreement would improve the 
welfare of an HT economy. These results are contrasted with 
those of sector-specific HT models. 
1. Introduction 
In many developing countries rising unemployment is often 
attributed to increases in foreign imports, triggered by 
declining foreign prices of imports. To correct the chronic 
unemployment problem, some developing countries chose an 
import substitution strategy by shutting off imports, whereas 
others adopted an outward-oriented policy by promoting 
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exports. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was 
favored by Mexico but opposed by organized labor in this 
country because it was feared that NAFTA may increase 
unemployment in the U.S. Which of these policies is more 
effective in reducing unemployment and raising domestic 
income? 
Protection has been ardently supported as a practical cure 
for unemployment in Chile and Argentina and many other LDCs in 
Latin America.' Similarly, India adopted import substitution 
strategies behind high protection and a considerable bias 
against exports (Ballassa, 1988). The literature has also 
justified the use of tariffs for small countries under 
uncertainty and unemployment (e.g., Choi and Lapan, 1991; Choi 
and Beladi, 1993). But in general, protection distorts the 
trade pattern and magnify the extent of the Leontief Paradox 
by limiting imports of capital intensive products into these 
developing countries that suffer from high labor unemployment 
(Casas and Choi, 1985). 
In the literature there have been two types of models that 
analyze trade problems in the presence of unemployment. The 
generalized unemployment models have been developed by Brecher 
(1974a, b) and Batra and Seth (1977) In these models, wage 
rigidity is ubiquitous and unemployment exists in all sectors, 
and they are appropriate to analyze the impact of trade 
policies on unemployment in developed economies. The Harris-
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Todaro (1970, HT hereafter) model, on the other hand, assumes 
sector-specific wage rigidity and permits unemployment only in 
the urban sector. Thus, the HT model is appropriate for 
investigating the impacts of trade policies of LDCs that 
suffer from urban unemployment, and it has been subsequently 
used by Hazari (1986), Batra and Beladi (1990), Chao and Yu 
(1990), Hazari and Sgro (1990), and Marjit (1991). 
This paper uses the HT model to investigate optimal trade 
policies for a developing country with labor unemployment. As 
in Corden and Findlay (1975), we assume that capital is mobile 
between sectors. It is shown that an import tariff is welfare-
reducing in an HT economy. If an optimal production subsidy, 
which is negative, is used, however, the optimal tariff is 
zero. The negative production subsidy on the importable is 
equivalent to a production subsidy on the exportable. Our 
findings have an important policy implication on trade 
policies of a labor surplus economy; an import tariff is 
welfare reducing, and therefore, for instance, the reduced 
tariffs of Mexico implemented by NAFTA would probably improve 
welfare of Mexico, which may be viewed as an HT economy.^ 
2. The Basic Model 
Consider a small open HT economy which has two sectors, a 
rural sector and an urban sector. Unemployment exists only in 
the urban area because of a fixed urban wage, but rural 
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workers are fully employed and paid a flexible wage. To 
analyze optimal trade policies of an HT economy, we employ the 
following assumptions: 
(i) Fixed supplies of capital (K) and labor (L) inputs, 
(ii) Capital is fully employed, but labor unemployment 
exists in the urban area because the fixed urban 
wage W is higher than the flexible rural wage w. 
(iii) The economy is small and imports the urban output X 
and exports the agricultural output Y, which is used 
as numeraire. 
Let Lj and Kj denote the labor and capital employed in 
sector j, respectively. The output of the urban manufacturing 
sector is 
X = F(L„KJ, (la) 
and the output of the rural sector is 
Y = G(Ly,Ky) , (lb) 
where F(-) and G(-) are linearly homogeneous production 
functions. 
Capital is a variable input and is mobile between the two 
sectors. Capital rental r is the same in both sectors and 
capital is fully utilized. However, due to wage rigidity in 
the manufacturing sector, some unemployment exists in the 
urban area. 
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Profit of the urban sector is 
TT, = PF - WL, - rK,, (2a) 
where P is the producer price of the urban output and W is the 
fixed urban wage. Profit of the rural sector is 
TTy = G - wLy - rKy, (2b) 
where w is the flexible rural wage and the price of the 
numeraire Y is unity. Observe that marginal product of inputs 
are homogeneous of degree zero in K and L. In the short run, 
however, capital input is fixed, and marginal product of labor 
is decreasing in L."* The first order conditions for optimal 
labor employment are: 
PFl - W = 0, (3a) 
Gl - w = 0. (3b) 
The solution of (3a) and (3b) yields conditional labor demand 
functions, = 1^(1^,P,W) and Ly = Ly(Ky,P,w). 
The rural wage w is equal to the expected urban wage. 
Thus, the relationship between the wages in the two sectors is 
given by the HT condition, 
w = iSw = W/ (1 + \) , (4) 
where 0 = 1/(1 + \) is the probability of employment, and X = 
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Lu/L^ is relative unemployment in the urban sector. 
In the HT model, labor demand falls short of labor supply, 
(1 + X)L^ + Ly = L, (5a) 
where XL* = represents labor unemployment in the urban 
sector. Capital market clearing requires 
K, + Ky = K. (5b) 
Equations (la) - (5b) complete the description of the 
production side of the HT model. 
3. Responses of Factor Prices and Urban Unemployment 
Perfect competition in product markets implies that the 
zero profit condition holds in "long run" equilibrium, 
although some labor unemployment exists in the urban sector 
because of wage rigidity. Thus, prices are equated to unit 
costs, 
P = WaLx + rag,, (6a) 
1 = wa^y + raKy, (6b) 
where a^'s are the input-output ratios. 
First, consider how fixing the urban wage W above that for 
the full employment level affects the flexible rural wage w 
and capital rental r. Differentiating (6a) and (6b) with 
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respect to W and holding P constant gives 
9r/9W = - a^/aKx = - = - l/k* < 0, (7a) 
9w/9w = ky/k^ < 1, (7b) 
9(w/r)/9w = [Ow/9W)r - w(9r/9w)]/r^ 
(rky/k^ + w/kj/r^ > 0, (7c) 
where kj s Kj/Lj is the capital-labor ratio in sector j. Thus, 
an increase in the urban wage unambiguously lowers the capital 
rental and the flexible wage-rental ratio, w/r. The 
manufacturing sector is assumed to be more capital intensive 
(kjj > ky) , and hence 1 > 9w/9w > 0, i.e., as the manufacturing 
wage increases the flexible rural wage increase less than 
proportionately. Differentiating (4) with respect to W gives 
if the Neary (1981) stability condition that the urban sector 
as a whole is capital abundant relative to the rural sector (k* 
> (1 + X)ky) is satisfied. Thus, an increase in the urban wage 
increases unemployment in the urban sector. 
In the Heckscher-Ohlin trade model, an increase in the 
price of a traded good necessarily raises one factor price and 
lowers the other, depending on the capital intensities of 
traded goods. How does a change in the producer price of the 
ÔX/6W = [kjj - (1 + X) ky] /wk* > 0, (7d) 
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importable affect equilibrium factor prices in the HT model? 
Since the urban wage is fixed, a change in P only affects 
capital rental r and the flexible rural wage w. 
Differentiating (6a) and (6b) and noting that Wda^* + rdag* = 
wdaLy + rda^y = 0 yields 
dP = aKxdr, 
0 = aLydw + a^ydr. 
Thus, we get 
3r/aP = 1/aKx = X/K, > 0. (8a) 
aw/ap = - ky(X/Kj <0. (8b) 
Thus, in the HT model, an increase in the price of the 
importable raises capital rental and reduces the flexible 
wage. Obseirve that this result is independent of factor 
intensities of traded goods. Intuitively, as the price of the 
importable increases, the capital rental in that sector has to 
rise to maintain the zero profit condition because the urban 
wage is fixed, which will attract more capital from the rural 
sector so as to equalize the capital rental between the two 
sectors. To maintain zero profit, the flexible wage must 
decline to offset the rise in unit cost caused by the increase 
in capital rental. 
Differentiating the HT condition (4) with respect to w and 
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holding W constant yields 
dX/dw = - (1 + X)/w < 0. (9) 
Hence, 
9X/9P = (9X/9w)(9W/9P) 
= [(1 + X)kY/kx] (X/wLj > 0. (10) 
This implies that an increase in the price of the importable 
will decrease the probability of urban employment, = 1/(1 + 
X). Intuitively, an increase in the price of the importable 
decreases the rural wage, which in turn induces more workers 
to seek employment in the urban area, thereby reducing the 
chance of urban employment. 
The results in this section are summarized in the following 
proposition. 
PROPOSITION 1; In a small open HT economy, an increase in the 
price of the importable increases capital rental, decreases 
the rural wage, and increases urban unemployment. 
4. Welfare Analysis 
Consumer preferences are represented by a monotone 
increasing and quasi-concave utility function, 
U = U(C,D) , 
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where C and D denote the aggregate consumption of the 
exportable and the importable, respectively. Let I denote 
consumer income, p the domestic consumer price, and let C(p,I) 
and D(p,I) be the demand functions obtained by maximizing U 
subject to a budget constraint, C + pD = I. Then the indirect 
utility is written as 
V s v[p,I] = U[C{p,I) ,D{p,I) ] . 
Import demand is given by 
Q = D(p,I) - X(P) , (11) 
and tariff revenue is 
T = (p - p*)Q = tQ, (12) 
where p* is the foreign price of the importable, t = p - p* is 
a specific tariff on the importable. 
We now investigate the effects of a production subsidy and 
a tariff on the HT economy in the short run. For policy 
analysis, capital inputs are assumed to be fixed and the 
supply curves are positively sloped. Let s denote the 
domestic subsidy on the production of the importable. Then 
the domestic producer price is P s p + s = p* +t+s. Profit 
maximizing competitive firms collectively maximize producer 
revenue 
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R = PX + Y. (13) 
Consumers receive income from the sale of factor services. 
Total factor income is wLy + WL* + rK* + rKy. Profit dividends 
to consumers are tTx + tty = (PX - WL^ - rKJ + (Y - wLy - rKy) . 
Net government revenue is G = (tQ - sX). Thus, total income 
is the sum of factor payments, profits, and net government 
revenue, and is equal to the sum of producer revenue and the 
net government revenue, I = R + G, or 
I = PX + Y + tQ - sX = pX + Y + tQ, (14) 
since P = p + s. 
To analyze the effect of import tariff and production 
subsidy on welfare, we first consider their impacts of on 
import, producer revenue and income. Differentiating (13) and 
using the first order conditions, (3a) and (3b), and the HT 
condition in (4), we have 
dR = XdP + PdX + dY = XdP + PF^dL^ + G^dLy + (PFk - Gk) dK^ 
= XdP + WdLx + wdLy = XdP + w[(l + X)dLx + dLy] . 
Total differentiating (5a) gives 
(1 + \)dL% + L^d\ + dLy = 0. 
Thus, 
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dR = XdP - wLjdX. (15) 
From (10), we have 
dX = [(1 + X)ky/kJ [X/(wLj ]dP 
[ax/ (wLJ ]dP 
where Ô = (1 + X)ky/k*. Therefore, 
dR = X(1 - a)dP. (15') 
Thus, dR/dt = dR/ds = (1 - Ô)X. Moreover, if the Neary 
stability condition is satisfied (Ô < 1), then for given 
foreign price p*, dR/dP >0. In other words, if k, > (1 + 
X)ky, then an increase in t or s increases the producer 
revenue. 
Next, totally differentiating (14) gives 
where Q = D(p,I) - X, and 
dQ = Dpdp + D,dl - X'dP 
= Dpdp + D,(dH + Qdt + tdQ) - X' (dp + ds) . 
Rearranging terms, we have 
dQ = [1/(1 - tD,)]{[iyp - ÔD,X - (1 + sD,)X']dt 
dl = dR + Qdt + tdQ - sdX - Xds, (16) 
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+ [ - aDiX - (1 + sD,)X']ds}. (17) 
where DJ, s (Dp + DD,) is the slope of the compensated demand 
curve. Note that since 0^ < 0, we get dQ/dt < dQ/ds < 0. That 
is, an import tariff reduces import more than a production 
subsidy. 
Substituting dR and dQ into (16), we obtain 
dl = [1/(1 - tD,)]{[(D - ax - (t + s)X'+ tDpldt 
+ [ - ax - (t + s)X']ds}. (16') 
Thus, dl/ds < 0 for all t & 0, s a 0. However, the sign of 
dl/dt is indeterminate. 
We now examine the effects of changes in a tariff and a 
production subsidy on welfare. The indirect utility function 
is rewritten as 
V[p,I] = V[p,PX + Y + tQ - sX] . (18) 
Totally differentiating (18), using the Roy's identity, and 
noting dp* = 0, gives 
dV = Vpdp + V,dl = V,(- Ddt + dl) 
= V,("Ddt + dR + tdQ + Qdt - sdX - Xds) 
= [Vi/(1 - tD,)]{[tEPp - ax - (t + s)X']dt 
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+ [ - ÔX - (t + s)X']ds} 
= [V,/(1 - tD,)](adt + /3ds), (19) 
where a = tOJ, + jS, and ^  - ÔX - (t + s)X'. Note that dV/ds 
Vi(dl/ds) < 0 and dV/dt < 0 for ail t a 0, s a 0. That is, a 
tariff or a production subsidy reduces the welfare of a small 
country in the HT labor-surplus economy. 
The first order conditions for an optimal combination of s 
and t are 
a = tEPp + jS = 0, (20a) 
0 = 0. (20b) 
This implies that 
t = 0, s = - ÔX/X' < 0, 
since OJ, < 0. That is, the optimal production subsidy is 
negative and the optimal tariff is zero in a HT open economy. 
Many LDCs lack revenue source to finance production 
subsidies, and rely instead on import tariffs. Consider an 
optimal tariff when the government is constrained to use only 
tariff (s = 0) . From (20a) , we get t = - jS/Oj,, or 
t = ax/(^ - X') <0. 
That is, the optimal tariff is negative when no production 
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subsidy or tax is used. These results are summarized below. 
PROPOSITION 2: An im.port tariff is welfare-reducing in an HT 
economy and the optimal tariff is negative. If a production 
subsidy is used, however, the optimal production subsidy on 
the importable is negative and the optimal tariff is zero. 
In the traditional HT model, capital is sector-specific, 
and the optimal policy consists of a wage subsidy in the 
manufacturing sector and a restriction of labor migration 
(Harris and Todaro, 1970). Restrictions on labor migration, 
however, is often considered infeasible by many economists. 
Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1971) instead proposed as first best 
policy, (i) a uniform wage subsidy, and (ii) a wage subsidy to 
manufacturing combined with a production subsidy to 
agriculture, which they claim to be "equivalent" to a tariff. 
Corden and Findlay (1975, p. 75) objected to tariffs on 
imports of manufactures because they conjectured that tariffs 
may fail to raise net output. 
Governments of many LDCs lack revenue source to finance the 
subsidy to agriculture. Instead they tend to tax imports of 
manufactures. When capital is mobile between sectors. 
Proposition 2 shows that such an import tariff is welfare-
reducing. Optimal trade policy rather requires a negative 
tariff on imports. Specifically, for instance, a reduction in 
Mexico's tariff to be implemented by NAFTA would improve 
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welfare of Mexico, which may be considered an HT economy. 
In a two-good framework, resource allocation depends only 
on the relative price and hence an import tariff (subsidy) is 
equivalent to an export tax (subsidy), which is Lerner's 
symmetry result. Proposition 2 implies that an import tariff 
is welfare-reducing and that a negative import tariff or an 
equal export subsidy, which discourages the domestic 
production of the importable, is welfare improving. However, 
when both production subsidy and tariff can be used, an 
optimal policy consists of a production tax on the importable 
(or equivalently a equal production subsidy on the exportable) 
and a zero tariff. Many small LDCs tend to rely heavily on 
import tariffs for revenue. Our result suggests that this 
practice should be abandoned in favor of a production tax on 
the importable. For example, let p* = $10 be the foreign 
price of the importable. Suppose an LDC imposes a specific 
tariff of $1 on the importable. Then the domestic price rises 
to $11. If instead a per unit tax of $1 is imposed on the 
production of the importable, then the net producer price 
reduces to $9. Our result suggests that the latter policy is 
superior to the former. 
5. Terms of Trade Effect under Tariff and Subsidy 
We consider the effects of a change in the terms of trade. 
Using (15) and (16') and noting that dp/dp* = 1 and dt = ds = 
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0, we get 
dR/dp* = (1 - ô)X, 
dl/dp* = dR/dp* + t(dQ/dp*) - sX' 
= (1 - ô)X + t[Dp + Di{dl/dp*) - X'] - sX', 
where dQ/dp* = Dp + D,(dl/dp*) - X'. Rearranging terms, we 
have 
dl/dp* = [(1 - ô)X + tDp - (t + s)X']/(l - tD,) . 
Thus, we have 
dV/dp* = Vp + V, (dl/dp*) 
= Vi{ - D + [1/(1 - tD,)]/[(l - Ô)X + tDp - (t + s)X']} 
= V,[ - Q - ax + tDp - (t + s)X']/(l - tD,) . 
That is, an improvement in the terms of trade necessarily 
improves welfare of an HT economy. 
PROPOSITION 3 ; An improvement in the terms of trade 
necessarily improves the welfare of a small open HT economy. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
This paper uses the HT model to analyze optimal trade 
policies of a small open labor-surplus economy with 
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intersectoral capital mobility. An increase in the price of 
the importable increases the capital rental but decreases the 
rural wage, regardless of the factor intensities of traded 
goods. It is shown that an import tariff is welfare-reducing 
and the optimal tariff is negative. However, if a production 
subsidy is used, the optimal production subsidy on the 
importable is negative and the optimal tariff is zero. 
East Asia and Latin America have sharply differed in their 
policies to correct unemployment and to spur economic growth. 
For example, during the last three decades. East Asian 
countries, including South Korea and Taiwan, have promoted 
rapid export expansion, whereas many Latin American countries 
such as Chile and Argentina relaxed export promotion efforts 
and shifted to inward orientation (Lin, 19 88). 
Our analysis has two important implications on trade 
policies some developing countries adopted during the last 
three decades. First, When LDCs lack other revenue sources to 
finance production subsidies, an import tariff raises 
government revenue but reduces domestic welfare. Thus, an 
optimal policy is an import subsidy (a negative import 
tariff), or equivalently, an equal export subsidy. For 
example. East Asian countries such as South Korea and Taiwan 
chose outward-oriented strategies. In contrast, Chile and 
Argentina tightened import controls, raised tariffs, and 
overvalued their currencies. Our results suggest that import 
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restrictions in these countries may be welfare-reducing. 
Second, if revenues can be generated, the optimal policy is 
not an export subsidy, but a production subsidy on the 
exportable (which is equivalent to a production tax on the 
importable). Production subsidy is superior to export 
subsidy, even though the latter promotes export more directly 
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Endnotes 
1. Chile and Argentina experienced unsatisfactory growth with 
fluctuating export earnings and rapid inflation that 
depressed domestic output (Lin, 1988). Theoretically, 
Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) suggest that economic 
integration increases the long run rate of growth, whereas 
Edwards (1992) explore the linkage between trade policy and 
growth. 
2. As Batra and Seth (1977) point out, the Brecher model has 
limited applications because it results in complete 
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specialization or production indeterminacy. 
3. That is, even if the positive welfare effects of lower U.S. 
and Canadian tariffs are not included. 
4. In the long run, both capital and labor are variable 
inputs, and linear homogeneity implies horizontal input 
demand curves. 
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SERVICES, UNDEREMPLOYMENT, AND TRADE POLICIES 
A paper submitted to Southern Economic Journal 
Jiong Chen 
Abstract 
This paper uses a three-sector Harris-Todaro model to 
investigate trade policies of a developing country. We 
introduce a nontraded service sector in the urban area which 
uses only labor as input. An increase in the price of the 
importable, or a technological progress in the manufacturing 
sector, lowers the service price under certain circumstances. 
An optimal policy consists of a zero import tariff and a 
production subsidy, which can be positive. When no production 
subsidy is used, the optimal tariff can also be positive. 
This result may justify the use of protectionist practices in 
some LDCs with a large informal urban sector. 
1. Introduction 
Despite the well known theory that a small country does not 
benefit from trade restrictions, very few LDCs indeed practice 
free trade. LDCs with little or no market power tend to adopt 
more restrictive policies than large industrial countries. 
Moreover, GATT also has provisions for permitting restrictive 
trade practices in LDCs under special circumstances. 
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Protection may be viewed as a second best policy when some 
distortions exist. For example, if the level of unemployment 
is high, protection may improve the welfare of a labor-surplus 
economy. 
The Harris-Todaro (1970) (HT, hereafter) model has been 
widely used to investigate urban unemployment in developing 
countries. The HT model assumes sector-specific wage 
rigidity, and hence unemployment is not ubiquitous but exists 
only in the urban sector. The HT model is appropriate for 
investigating the impacts of trade policies of LDCs that 
suffer from urban unemployment, and it has been subsequently 
used by Hazari (1986), Batra and Beladi (1990), Chao and Yu 
(1990, 1992), Hazari and Sgro (1990), and Marjit (1991). 
Two sector models are overly simplistic to describe urban 
unemployment in many LDCs. In these countries, the urban area 
provides opportunities for employment outside the 
manufacturing sector. Only a small fraction of workers who 
move to the urban area are employed in the manufacturing 
sector, and the rest — especially those who move late to the 
urban area — is forced to stay in the informal sector while 
searching for a permanent job. Todaro (1969) noted that the 
informal urban sector serves as a springboard for immigrants 
to enter the formal or manufacturing sector. In fact, it is 
difficult to distinguish those who are "employed" (usually 
underemployed) in the informal sector and those who are not 
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employed at all; many immigrants are supported by their 
families or relatives who arrived earlier, or are engaged in 
the family-operated "petty trade" businesses, sharing their 
income. The "wage" of a worker in the informal sector is just 
the average income of the sector, which is flexible. For 
example, as more people move into the informal sector, the 
average income declines. 
Chao and Yu (1992) first developed a three sector Harris-
Todaro model to explain the existing and enlarging gap between 
the prices of services in the LDCs and industrial countries. 
In their model, capital is assumed to be sector specific and 
all the sectors use both capital and labor as inputs. Since a 
flexible service wage is used, there is no urban unemployment. 
In this paper, we also assume a flexible wage in the service 
sector. As in the HT model, the agricultural wage is flexible 
and the manufacturing wage is fixed and higher than the 
former. But we assume that the service sector uses only labor 
as input, while the other two sectors, the urban manufacturing 
and the rural agriculture, use both capital and labor as 
inputs. This assumption is realistic for the service sector 
in many developing countries. 
In this paper we investigate the employment and welfare 
effects of commercial policies of a small labor-surplus open 
economy. It is shown that a technological improvement in the 
manufacturing sector under certain conditions will widen the 
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gap in service prices between the developed and developing 
countries. An optimal trade policy consists of a production 
subsidy on the manufacturing sector, which can be positive, 
and a zero import tariff. 
2. The Model 
We consider a small open economy which embraces two areas 
and three sectors. The rural area produces the agricultural 
output Y. The urban area consists of two sectors: the 
manufacturing sector producing X, and the service sector 
producing Z. The economy exports the agricultural product Y, 
which is used as numeraire, and imports the manufactured good 
X. Services Z are assumed to be a nontraded good. The 
aggregate supplies of capital K and labor L are assumed fixed. 
Capital is fully employed, but labor underemployment exists in 
the urban area due to wage rigidity. 
Let Lj and Kj denote the labor and capital employed in 
sector j, respectively. Let X, Y, and Z denote the outputs of 
the manufacturing sector, the agricultural sector, and the 
service sector, respectively. While the agricultural sector 
and the urban manufacturing sector employ both capital and 
labor as inputs, the urban service sector uses only labor in 
the production of its output which is consumed only 
domestically. The outputs of the three sectors are: 
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X = F(L„KJ , (la) 
Y = G(Ly,Ky) , (lb) 
Z = H(LJ, (le) 
where the production functions, F('), G(-), and H(*) are 
assumed to be linearly homogeneous. 
At the beginning of a production period, a worker can 
choose to work in the urban area or in the rural area. Once 
the location choice is made, the worker cannot move to the 
other area during the same production period but is free to 
move again at the beginning of the next period. Because the 
rural wage is flexible, employment is guaranteed in the rural 
area. But if a worker chooses the urban area, there is a 
chance that the worker may not find a job in the manufacturing 
sector and end up in the urban service sector. 
The manufacturing wage W is fixed and is usually above the 
flexible rural wage because of union contracts. If unemployed 
by the manufacturing sector, the worker cannot move to the 
rural area immediately, but must wait until the next period 
starts. Thus, urban workers not employed by the manufacturing 
sector would flock to the service sector, earning much less 
than a worker employed in the manufacturing sector. On the 
other hand, capital is completely mobile among the 
agricultural and the manufacturing sectors and the capital 
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market is perfectly competitive. Thus, capital rental r is 
the same in the two sectors. 
Let y be the numeraire and its price be unity. Profits of 
the three sectors are: 
= pF - WL; - rK,, (2a) 
TTy = G - wLy - r K y ,  (2b) 
TTz = bH - eLj,, (2c) 
where W is the fixed wage in the manufacturing sector, e the 
flexible "wage" in the service sector, and p and b are the 
producer prices of the manufactures and services, 
respectively. 
Perfect competition in product markets implies that the 
zero profit condition holds in "long run" equilibrium. Thus, 
unit costs are equated to producer prices, 
P = Skx r + aLx W, (3a) 
1 = aKy r + aLy w, (3b) 
b = a^ e, (3c) 
where a^ is the amount of input i to produce one unit of good 
j. Factor market clearing requires 
Ljj + Ly + Ljj = L, (4a) 
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+ Ky = K. (4b) 
Recall that at the beginning of a period, a worker is free 
to enter the urban or rural area. Following the HT model, we 
assume that the flexible rural wage is equated to the expected 
urban wage. 
which is the Harris-Todaro condition with two urban wages. 
Consumer preferences are represented by a monotone 
increasing and quasi-concave utility function, U = U(B,C,D), 
where B, C, and D denote consumption of the services, the 
exportable (agricultural), and the importable (manufactures), 
respectively. Since service is a nontraded good, B = z. Let 
t denote a specific tariff levied on imports, and let p* be 
the world price of the importable. The domestic consumer 
price of the importable is 
p = p* + t. (6) 
Suppose the home country also supports the import competing 
sector. Let s denote the per unit subsidy on the production 
of the manufactured good X. Then the domestic producer price 
of the importable is 
p = p* + t + s, (7) 
w [L,/(L, + LJ] W + [L,/(L, + LJ] e. (5) 
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Let I denote consumer income, and let B(b,p,I), C(b,p,I), and 
D(b,p,I) be the demand functions obtained by maximizing U 
subject to the budget constraint. Then the indirect utility 
is written as 
V = V[b,p,I] = U[B(b,p,I) ,C{b,p,I) ,D(b,p,I) ] . 
Import demand is 
Q(b,p,I) = D(b,p,I) - X(p) . (8) 
Consumer income I is endogenously determined, and it can be 
written as 
I = rK + WL* + wLy + eLj, + tQ - sX, (9) 
where the first four terms are payments to factors, (tQ - sX) 
is the net government revenue, and is, following tradition, 
assumed to be rebated to the consumers. Using the HT 
condition, equation (5), we can rewrite (9) as 
I = rK + wL + tQ - sX, (10) 
because WL* + wLy + eLj, = wL, i.e., total labor income is the 
product of the agricultural wage w and the total number of 
workers in the economy L. 
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3. Responses of Factor and Service Prices 
In the Heckscher-Ohlin trade model, an increase in the 
price of a traded good necessarily raises one factor price and 
lowers the other, depending on the capital intensity of traded 
goods. How does a change in the terms of trade affect factor 
prices in this three-sector HT model? Since there are two 
traded good and two factors, the addition of the service 
sector into the original HT model do not alter the effect of 
the a change in, say, the price of manufactures on the returns 
to factors. Totally differentiating equation (3a) - (3b) and 
noting that dW = 0 and rda^* + Wda^x = rda^y + wda^ = rda^^ + 
edaLz = 0, we have 
dr/dp = 1/aKx = X/K, > 0 (lia) 
9w/ap = -a^y/ (a^yaKx) = - kyX/K^ < 0. (lib) 
The derivatives are the same as in the standard two-sector HT 
model, as mentioned earlier. 
The service wage e and the service price b are also 
endogenous and determined domestically. The impact of a 
change in the price of the importable p on e can not be 
determined in the system of equations (3a)-(3c). We use the 
HT condition (5) to study the effect on the service wage of a 
change in p. Let |8 = L^/(L^ + L^) be the relative employment in 
the urban manufacturing sector, then we can rewrite (5) as 
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w = |8W + (1 - /3)e, (5') 
Taking the partial derivative of both sides with respect to p 
and noting 9w/9p = 0 yields 
9w/3p = (W - e) (9|8/9p) + (1 - j8) (9e/9p) , 
which, after rearranging, leads to 
9e/9p = [1/(1 - i8)][9w/5p - (W - e) Oj8/9p) ] , (11c) 
where 1 - j8 > 0, 9w/9p < 0, and (W - e) >0. Differentiating 
i8 = L*/ (Lx + L^) yields 
d^/dp = [(L; +LJ OLyap) - L^(9L^/3p + dhjdp) ] / + LJ ^ 
= [1/(L, + LJ^] [L,(ÔL,/ap) - L,OL,/ap)] 
= {L,L,/[p(L, + LJ:] }(E, - e,) , (12) 
where 6^ = (âL^âp) (p/L^) and 6% = OLj./5p) (p/L^) are the 
elasticities of labor supply in the manufacturing and the 
service sectors, respectively, with respect to the price of 
the manufactures. It is obvious that €% > 0 but the sign of 6% 
is ambiguous. Even when 6% > 0, it is reasonable to assume 
that €* - €2 > 0, because a change in p, the price of 
manufactured goods, has only indirect effect on the employment 
of the service sector. In this case, d^/dp > 0. 
An implication of this result is that an increase in the 
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production subsidy or a tariff in the import competing sector 
or tariff may alleviate the problem of urban underemployment 
outside the manufacturing sector. Finally, equation (3c) 
implies that 9b/9p has the same sign as 9e/3p. These results 
are summarized below. 
Proposition 1: In a Harris-Todaro economy with services, an 
increase in the price of the importable increases capital 
rental but reduces the wages in the rural sector; it also 
reduces the service wage and the service price if e* - e^) > 0. 
It should be noted that the standard two-sector HT model 
can be viewed as a special case of the present model where e = 
0. Thus (5') implies 9jS/3w = 1/W > 0 and (11c) implies ôjS/ôp 
= {d^/dw) (9w/9p) < 0, since 3w/9p < 0 from (lib). Thus, in 
the two-sector HT model, an increase in the price of the 
manufacturing sector reduces the relative employment in that 
sector. 
Many authors observed the widening gap in the prices of 
services between rich and poor countries. Chao and Yu (1992), 
for example, attribute this phenomenon to technological 
progress, based on a three-sector HT model with capital 
immobility and a rigid manufacturing wage. 
This paper provides an alternative explanation for the 
widening wage gap in the service sectors, using a three-sector 
HT model with asymmetrical production structure. Suppose that 
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an improvement in technology occurs in the manufacturing 
sector. To assess the impact of a neutral technological 
change in manufacturing, the production function in (la) is 
replaced by X = «F (K*, L*) , where a & 1. Because of constant 
returns to scale technology, a technological progress (a > 1) 
is equivalent to an increase in the output price (from p to 
ap). After replacing p with op, equations (3a) - (3c) and (5) 
can be used to analyze the effects of a technological 
improvement. This implies that a neutral technological 
progress in the manufacturing sector will lower the price of 
services if e, - 0. 
To predict the behavior of service price in rich countries, 
important changes have to be made about the assumptions. 
First, the service sector in rich countries also uses capital 
input, which is becoming increasingly important. 
Specifically, services are assumed to be more capital 
intensive than agriculture and less intensive than 
manufactures. Second, as in Chao and Yu (1992), we assume 
that labor market distortions do not exist in rich countries 
(i.e., w = e = w and w is flexible). In this case, the zero 
profit conditions for the three sectors are written as: 
P = r + a^x w, (3a' ) 
1 = aKy r + a^y w, (3b') 
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b = r + a^, w. (3c' ) 
Differentiation of equations (3a') - (3c') leads to, among 
others, 9b/9p >0, if the manufacturing sector is most capital 
intensive and the agricultural sector is most labor 
intensive.' Therefore, a technological progress in the 
manufacturing sector increases the service price in rich 
countries. 
Proposition 2: In a Harris-Todaro economy, a neutral 
technological improvement in the manufacturing sector lowers 
the price of services, if e* - €% > 0, whereas it raises the 
price of services in a rich country if k, > > ky. Thus, such 
a technological improvement widens the gap between the service 
prices in developed and developing countries. 
4. Tariff, Subsidy, and Welfare 
In this section, we analyze the effects on the expected 
welfare of a production subsidy to the manufacturing sector 
and a tariff on imports. Totally differentiating V(b,p,I) = 
V(b,p* + t,I), using the Roy's identity, and noting that dp = 
dt, dp = dt + ds, we have: 
dV = Vpdp + Vydb + V,dl = V^dt + V^bp (dt + ds) + V,dl 
= V,[- (D + Bbp)dt - Bbpds + dl] , (13) 
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where, as defined earlier, B, C, and D denote consumption of 
the services, the exportable (agricultural), and the 
importable (manufactures), respectively. Since service is a 
nontraded good, B = Z, the output of that sector. Variables 
with subscripts b, p and p denote the corresponding partial 
derivatives. For instance, bp = 9b/9p. Totally differentiating 
(10) gives 
dl = Kdr + Ldw + Q + tdQ - sdX -Xds 
= [Krp + LWp - sX' ] dp + tdQ + Qdt - Xds 
= [Krp + LWp - sX' + Q]dt 
+ (Krp + LWp - SX' - X)ds + tdQ, (14) 
where X' = dX/dp, Q = Q(b,p,I) = D(b,p,I) - X(p) and 
dQ = Dpdp + Dydb + D[dl - dX 
= Dpdt + Dbbp(dt +ds) + D,dl - X' (dt + ds) 
= [D^ + Dybp - X']dt + D,di + [Dybp - X']ds. (15) 
Combining (14) and (15), we have 
dl = [1/(1 - tD,)]-{a + t[D, + Dbbp - X']}dt 
+ [1/(1 - tD,)]-{a - D + t [Dbbp - X']}ds, (16) 
where a = Krp + LWp - sX' + Q. Finally, substituting (16) into 
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(13) and using (lia) and (lib), we have 
dV = [V,/(l - tD,)] (7dt + ads), (17) 
Ô = - (t + s)X' + (1 - L/Ly) Ky/aKx + (tEt" - B)bp, (18a) 
7 = 0 + tr^". (18b) 
where E^" s + DD, (< 0) is the slope of a compensated demand 
curve, s Db + BD, is the change of compensated demand for D 
with respect to a change in the price of services, and X' is 
the slope of the domestic supply of the importable. For an 
optimal solution to exist, the term (l - tD;) must be invariant 
in sign.2 
Assume that services and agricultural product are normal. 
Then 1 - pDj > 0 and 1 - tD, >0. If services and the 
importable are Hicksian complements, then an increase in the 
price of a good decreases the compensated demand for its 
complement (E^" = < 0) . 
At an optimal combination of production subsidy and import 
tariff (s,t), 0=7=0. This implies tE^ = 0, or 
which is indeterminate in sign, since 1 - L/Ly < 0 and bp = 
t* = 0, (19a) 
and the optimal production subsidy is 
s* = [(1 - L/Ly) Ky/aKx - Bbp]/X', (19b) 
60 
3b/3p < 0. This implies that in the absence of a tariff, a 
production subsidy to the import competing sector can increase 
welfare. This verifies the well known result that a 
production subsidy is superior to a tariff, since a tariff may 
improve employment but not welfare when both policy 
instruments are used.^ These results are summarized below; 
Proposition 3: In a three sector HT economy with services, the 
optimal policy consists of a production subsidy and a zero 
tariff. The production subsidy is also zero for small 
industrial countries (w = W = e), but in developing countries, 
the production subsidy to the import competing sector can be 
positive. 
The intuition for this result is straightforward. In this 
Harris-Todaro economy, there is one rigid wage, the fixed 
manufacturing wage W. Obviously, the first best policy is to 
eliminate the wage distortion in the urban area, but the fixed 
wage is institutionally determined. Since the wage distortion 
originates in the domestic economy, a production tax or 
subsidy is more efficient and beneficial than a tariff. Once 
an optimal production subsidy/tax is chosen, there is no need 
to further distort consumer prices — except to exploit 
monopoly power in trade for a large economy — and hence an 
import tariff is redundant. 
Next, consider optimal policies when the government is 
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constrained to use only one instrument. For a given 
production subsidy, an optimal tariff satisfies 
av/at  = 7  = 0 ,  
which gives the optimal tariff as 
t° = [sX' + Bbp - (1 - L/Ly)Ky/aKx]/[^" - X' + E^p] . (20a) 
In general, the sign of t" is indeterminate. That is, for any 
given s a 0, the optimal tariff t can be positive or negative. 
This result is not inconsistent with Chen and Choi's (1993) 
finding that the optimal tariff is negative in the standard 
two-sector Harris-Todaro model. In fact, except for the terms 
related to the service sector (bp and E|,") , equation (20a) is 
exactly the same as its counterpart in the two-sector model. 
The important implication of (20a) is that an import tariff 
may be justified in the existence of a service sector, unlike 
the traditional HT model where the informal sector is not 
included. 
For a given import tariff, the optimal production subsidy 
satisfies 
dV/ds = 5 = 0 ,  
which gives the optimal subsidy as 
S° = [(1 - L/Ly)Ky/aKx - tX' + (tEf - B)bp]/X'. (20b) 
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For any given t, the optimal production subsidy s can be 
positive or negative. If t = 0, then we get a globally 
optimal production subsidy in (19b). Again, this means that 
it may be economically sensible to protect the manufacturing 
industries in the LDCs in the presence of a service sector in 
urban areas. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
This paper introduced a service sector into the traditional 
Harris-Todaro model and investigated optimal trade policies of 
a labor-surplus developing economy. The traditional HT model 
is overly simplified in that the urban workers rejected by the 
manufacturing sector are all unemployed. However, in most 
LDCs, urban workers may have a second chance to find 
employment by accepting a lower wage in the service sector. 
Moreover, in many low-income LDCs the service sector is the 
major source of urban employment. 
We have developed a three-sector Harris-Todaro model of a 
labor-surplus open economy. It was shown that an increase in 
the price of the importable (the manufactured good) not only 
reduces the flexible wage in the rural sector, but also the 
wage in the service sector and the price of services. 
Likewise, a technological progress in the manufacturing sector 
reduces the price of services in LDCs under certain 
circumstances, widening the gap between the service prices in 
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the poor and rich countries. 
An optimal trade policy for an HT economy with services 
consists of a zero tariff and a production subsidy. The 
optimal production subsidy can be positive or negative, 
whereas in a two-sector model the optimal production subsidy 
is negative. Given a production subsidy, the optimal tariff 
is indeterminate in sign. But once an optimal production 
subsidy or tax is used, there is no need to supplement it with 
an import tariff. If no production subsidy is allowed, the 
optimal tariff can be positive. In contrast, the optimal 
tariff is negative in the absence of the service sector. 
Thus, the introduction of the service sector into the 
traditional HT model may explain why protectionist practices 
so prevalent in LDCs. 
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Endnotes 
1. Totally differentiating (3a') - (3c') yields among 
others 
dh/dp = aKz(9r/5p) + a^^Jw/gp) = aLzdc^ - ky) /aLx(k;, - ky) . 
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Since the service sector is assumed to have intermediate 
capital intensity (k, > k% > k^), then 9b/9p > 0, 
2. The existence of optimal production subsidy and tariff 
require that dV/dt = 3v/9s = 0. Moreover, if (1 - tD,) 
changes its sign as t or s changes, then it must be zero 
at some point, in which case dV/ds or dV/dt is 
undefined, and hence an optimal solution does not exist. 
3. As a special case, when there is no service sector, 
(19b) reduces to 
s = [(1 - L/Ly) Ky/^Kx]/X', 
which is unambiguously negative. See also Chen and Choi 
(1993) where a two-sector HT model is studied. 
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EMPLOYMENT RISK, RISK AVERSION, AND TRADE POLICIES 
A paper to be submitted to Journal of Political Economy 
Jiong Chen 
Abstract 
This paper considers trade policies and welfare in a 
Harris-Todaro model with risk averse workers. Workers are 
assumed to have identical and homothetic preferences, but 
their incomes differ, depending on whether and where they are 
employed. When workers are equally weighted, maximizing 
social utility is equivalent to maximizing the utility of a 
rural worker. An optimal policy consists of a production 
subsidy on the exportable and an import tariff. This model 
explains the widespread use of import tariffs of manufactured 
goods along with production subsidies on the export sectors in 
some LDCs. 
1. Introduction 
While some developing countries have relied on import 
substitution policies (Ballassa, 1988), some East Asian LDCs 
such as South Korea and Taiwan have adopted outward-looking 
strategies. They have promoted exports by subsidizing 
production of exportable goods extensively, while limiting 
imports of finished manufactures. Despite the theory that a 
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tariff hurts a small open economy, these countries have 
experienced phenomenal economic growth. On the whole, these 
strategies seem to have been quite successful. During the 
1963-73 period, the growth rates of strongly outward-oriented 
developing countries were 7.4%, whereas those of strongly 
inward-oriented developing countries recorded an average 
growth rate of about 1.7% (World Bank, 1987). 
The Harris-Todaro (1970, HT hereafter) model of a labor 
surplus economy captures a stylized fact in many LDCs: 
continuous labor migration to the urban sector and high urban 
unemployment. Wage is assumed to be flexible and employment 
is guaranteed in the rural sector, whereas in the urban sector 
wage is fixed institutionally at a level above the competitive 
wage. The urban workers face unemployment risk; the urban 
workers earn a higher fixed wage if employed, but earn nothing 
if unemployed. The HT model explains the use of production 
subsidies on the exportable goods in these countries (Bhagwati 
and Srinivasan, 1974). However, it does not explain why an 
import tariff should also be employed, despite its widespread 
use in LDCs.' Chen and Choi (1993) demonstrate that a tariff 
is welfare-reducing in an HT economy. 
The underlying assumption of the HT model is that the 
flexible rural wage is determined at a level equal to the 
expected wage in the urban sector. In other words, workers 
are indifferent between a random compensation in the urban 
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sector and a nonrandom rural wage, equal to the expected wage 
in the urban sector. This implies that workers are risk 
neutral. With the exception of Corden and Findlay (1975) 
suggesting that workers may be risk averse, the literature has 
since adopted the risk neutrality assumption to explore the 
properties and policy questions within the HT model (e.g.. 
Marjit, 1991; Neary, 1981; Chao and Yu, 1990). 
Corden and Findlay (1975) suggested among others that 
production subsidies and import tariffs are not desirable in 
the risk neutral case.^ Their implicit criterion for 
evaluating policies was the net change in total output. In 
this paper we use social utility as a welfare criterion to 
evaluate trade policies and investigate the implications of 
risk aversion on trade policies of a small open economy. 
Workers are assumed to be risk averse, willing to accept a 
nonrandom wage that is lower than the expected wage in the 
urban sector. Specifically, rural wage is equal to certainty-
equivalent wage in the urban sector. We adopt a social 
welfare function that gives equal weights to all workers. The 
most striking result is that when an optimal production 
subsidy is employed, an import tariff is welfare improving 
when workers are risk averse. This could explain why so many 
LDCs restrict imports of manufactured goods. 
2. The Basic Model 
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The economy consists of two sectors; the urban sector 
produces a manufactured good X and the rural sector an 
agricultural good Y. All consumers are workers and receive 
income from labor services and capital endowment. To extend 
the Harris-Todaro model to an open economy with risk averse 
workers, we employ the following assumptions: 
(i) Supplies of capital (K) and labor (L) inputs are fixed. 
(ii) Each worker has one unit of labor and the ownership of 
the capital inputs is uniformly distributed among 
consumers. 
(iii) Capital is fully employed, but labor unemployment 
exists in the urban sector due to wage rigidity. 
(iv) The economy is small and imports the urban output X and 
exports the rural output Y. 
(v) Workers are risk averse and have identical and 
homothetic preferences. 
(vi) There is no price uncertainty or production 
uncertainty. 
Because the aggregate capital endowment K is uniformly 
distributed among L workers, each worker owns k = K/L units of 
capital and receives capital income rk, where r is the rental 
rate. Assumption (ii) is used to abstract from distributional 
issues and to focus on the aggregate welfare analysis. 
70 
Although workers have identical preferences in consumption, 
they may be classified into three categories depending on 
their income levels. Rural workers are fully employed and 
receive a flexible wage w. An urban employed worker receives 
the fixed wage W, which is institutionally set at a higher 
level than the competitive wage w and, thus W is not allowed 
to move either downward or upward. An urban worker earns no 
labor income if unemployed and relies on capital income only. 
Let Lj and K, denote the labor and capital employed in 
sector i, respectively. The output of the urban manufacturing 
sector is 
X = F(L,,KJ , (la) 
and the output of the rural sector is 
Y = G{Ly,Ky) , (lb) 
where F(-) and G(*) are linearly homogeneous production 
functions. 
Capital is a variable input and is mobile between the two 
sectors. Thus, capital rental r is the same in both sectors. 
However, following the HT model, we assume that due to wage 
rigidity in the urban sector, wages are different between the 
two sectors. 
Profit of the urban sector is 
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7^ = PF - WL^ - rKx, (2a) 
where P is the producer price of the urban output and W is the 
fixed urban wage. Let y be the numeraire. Then the profit of 
the rural sector is 
TTy = G - wLy - rKy, (2b) 
where w is the flexible rural wage and the price of the 
numeraire is Py = 1. Note that marginal product of each input 
is homogeneous of degree zero in K and L. 
Perfect competition in product markets implies that the 
zero profit condition holds in "long run" equilibrium, 
although some "equilibrium" labor unemployment exists in the 
urban sector because of wage rigidity. Thus, prices are 
equated to unit costs, 
P = Wa^x + raKx, (3a) 
1 = wa^y + raKy, (3b) 
where ay denote the amount of factor i employed to produce one 
unit of product j. Due to wage rigidity, there exists some 
unemployment Ly in the urban sector. Total demand for labor in 
the two sectors falls short of the labor supply, 
(1 + X)Lx + Ly = L, (4a) 
where X s L^/L^ is the relative unemployment in the urban 
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sector. Capital market clearing requires 
K, + = K. (4b) 
To complete the description of the production side of the 
model, an additional equation is needed to connect the wages 
in the two sectors. In the HT model, workers are assumed to 
be risk neutral, and hence expected urban wage is equal to the 
flexible rural wage, 
w = W/ (1 + X) . 
In this paper, workers are assumed to be risk averse and they 
must be paid extra compensation above the nonrandom rural wage 
for taking a chance in the urban sector, i.e., w < W/(l + X). 
This relationship will be more formally described in terms of 
utility functions later in the paper. 
3. Output Prices and Factor Prices 
In the Heckscher-Ohlin trade model, an increase in the 
price of a traded good necessarily raises one factor price and 
lowers the other, depending on the capital intensity of traded 
goods. How does a change in the terms of trade affect factor 
prices in the HT model? Since the urban wage is fixed, a 
change in p only affects capital rental r and the flexible 
rural wage w. Differentiating (3a) and (3b) and noting that 
WdaLx + rdaKx = wda^ + rda^y = 0 yields 
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dP = aK^dr, 
0 = a^dw + a^ydr. 
Thus, we get 
dr/dP = 1/aKx = X/K, > 0. (5a) 
aw/ap = - ky(X/Kj < 0, (5b) 
where ky = Ky/Ly. Thus, in the Harris-Todaro model, an increase 
in the price of the importable raises rental on capital input 
and reduces the flexible wage in the export sector. Observe 
that unlike the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem in the Heckscher-
Ohlin model, this result does not depend on the factor 
intensity rankings of traded goods. The result also holds 
regardless of risk attitudes of workers, because employment 
risk only affects individual workers, and the competitive 
firms do not face risk in the price or production uncertainty. 
The intuition for this Stolper-Samuelson-like result is 
straightforward: an increase in the price of the manufactured 
good necessarily will increase the rental rate (%%) in that 
sector since the urban wage rate (W) is fixed, which leads to 
an increase in the rural rental rate (ry) since capital is 
mobile between sectors. For a small country, the price of the 
agricultural product is also fixed by the world market, thus 
the rural wage rate (w) has to decrease in order for the zero-
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profit condition to hold. 
4. Risk Aversion 
Consumer preferences are represented by a monotone 
increasing and concave utility function, U = U(C,D), where C 
and D denote consumption of the exportable and the importable, 
respectively. Let I denote consumer income, land p be the 
consumer price of the manufactured good X. In the absence of 
production tax or subsidy, p = P. Let C(p,I) and D(p,I) be 
the demand functions obtained by maximizing U subject to the 
individual's budget constraint, C + pD = I. Then the indirect 
utility of a consumer is written as 
V = V[p,I] = U[C(p,I) ,D(p,I)] . 
Since workers are risk averse in income, V„ < 0.^ 
Workers have identical preferences, but their incomes are 
different, depending on whether they are employed in the rural 
sector, employed in the urban sector or unemployed. Let I^, 
I®, and I" denote his income when he is employed in the rural 
sector, the urban sector and when he is unemployed, 
respectively, i.e., 
= rk + w. (6a) 
r = rk + W. (6b) 
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I" = rk. (6c) 
The indirect utility of the worker in the rural sector is 
If a worker is employed in the urban sector, his utility is V® 
= V[p,rk + W] , but it is V" = V[p,rk] if unemployed. The 
expected utility of the representative urban worker is then 
where /3 = 1/(1 + X) is the probability of employment in the 
urban sector. Note that (3 and X move in the opposite 
directions. 
Let the risk premium p be implicitly defined by 
|8v[p,rk + W] + (1 - i8)V[p,rk] = V[p,rk + jSw - p ]  .  ( 8 )  
The left side of (8) is expected utility of a worker entering 
the urban sector. Note that if the certainty equivalent 
income on the right side of (8) were equal to the income of a 
worker when unemployed (p = jSw) , then the left side would be 
greater than the right side for all /3 > 0. Thus, certainty 
equivalent income of the urban worker must be greater than the 
income of an unemployed worker (p < j8w) . Expected urban wage 
is jSW, and expected total income of a worker in the urban 
sector is rk + jSW. If the worker is risk neutral, then p is 
= V [p, rk + w] . (7a) 
V* s j8*v[p,rk + W] + (1 - j8)V[p,rk], (7b) 
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zero, but p is positive if the worker is risk averse in income 
{V„ < 0) . 
At the beginning of each period, a worker can enter the 
rural sector earning the certain but flexible wage w, or he 
can enter the urban sector, earning a higher and fixed urban 
wage W if employed, or face unemployment. The equilibrium 
probability of employment /3 = 1/(1 + X) satisfies the 
condition that expected utility of income in both sectors, V 
and V^, are the same, i.e., 
V[p, rk + jSW - p] = V[p, rk + w] . (9) 
This equilibrium condition reduces to the Harris-Todaro 
condition when the worker is risk neutral in income. Equation 
(9) shows the relationship between the equilibrium rural wage 
and the fixed urban wage when workers are risk averse, and 
hence is called the general HT condition. From (9) and (8) , 
we get 
w = jSw - p (i8,p, rk,W) . (10) 
Although the risk premium function p(*) depends on the 
parameters of (8), it can also be observed when the labor 
market is in equilibrium. The observed difference between the 
expected wage in the urban sector and the rural wage is thus 
the risk premium in equilibrium, p = jSW - w. 
All workers are assumed to have identical and homothetic 
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preferences. We employ a social utility function which gives 
equal weights to all workers. That is, the social utility is 
the sum of utilities of all workers. However, consumer income 
depends on whether he is employed in the rural sector, or the 
urban sector, or unemployed. Using the probability of 
employment, total social utility is (L - Ly)V* + LyV^, or 
S = (L - Ly) • {i8V[p,rk + W] + (1 - i8)V[p,rk]} 
+ Ly-V[p, rk + w] . (11) 
Because workers are mobile between the urban and the rural 
sectors, the rural wage w is in equilibrium when the general 
HT condition in (9) is satisfied. Thus, 
S = L-V[p,rK + w] = LVy. (12) 
That is, the social utility of all workers is the utility of a 
rural worker (or the expected utility of an urban worker 
before employment status is known) multiplied by the total 
number of workers. 
5. Tariff, Production Subsidy, and Welfare 
We now investigate the welfare implications of production 
subsidy and import tariff when workers are risk averse. Let t 
denote a specific tariff levied on imports, and let p* be the 
foreign price of the importable. The domestic consumer price 
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of the importable is p = p* + t. Producer price is P = p + s, 
where s is per unit production subsidy on the manufactured 
good. Import demand is 
Q(p,I) = D(p,I) - X(P) , (13) 
where I is consumer income, which is endogenously determined. 
The government collects tariff (or quota) revenue (p - p*)Q, 
but pays production subsidy sX. Following convention, we 
assume that net government revenue, (p - p*)Q - sX, is rebated 
to all workers equally. The per capita rebate is (p - p*)q -
SX, where q = Q/L and x = X/L." With the rebate, social 
utility is given by 
S = (L - Ly) • {j8v[p, rk + W + tq - sx] 
+ (1 - 0)V[p,rk + tq - sx] } 
+ Ly'V[p,rk + w + tq - sx] . (14) 
Since the expected utility of the urban worker is equal to the 
utility of the rural worker for any given level of tariff 
revenue, (14) reduces to 
S = LV(p,iy) = V[p, (rK + wL + (p - p*)Q - sX)/L],(15) 
where = (rK + wL + (p - p*)Q - sX)/L is rural worker's 
income after the revenue rebate. Since the labor endowment L 
is given, social welfare is maximized if and only if the 
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utility of the rural worker is maximized. 
6. The Effect of Tariff and Subsidy 
Recall that preferences are identical and homothetic, so 
that the income elasticity of demand for the importable good 
is unity. Thus, the demand for the importable good increases 
proportionately as income increases, and is independent of the 
distribution of income among consumers. Observe that the 
certainty equivalent income of an urban worker is equal to 
in equilibrium. Thus, the total certainty equivalent income 
is simply LP. Let d(p) denote the demand for the importable 
good when income is $1, i.e., d(p) = D(p,l). Then Roy's 
identity implies Vp = - V[d(p) x income. 
Actual aggregate income is I* = (rK + WL* + wLy + tQ - sX). 
Let 6 denote the ratio of rural worker's income, F, to the 
actual per capita income, I*/L, i.e., 
e = I^L/I^ 
= (rK + wL + tQ - sX)/(rK + WL^ + wLy + tQ - sX) . (16) 
Then the total certainty equivalent income of all workers is 
I^L = #1*. It can be shown that 0=1 when workers are risk 
neutral, but 0 < 1 when workers are risk averse.^ Recall that 
jSW > /o a 0. So, 0 is bounded below.* 
We now investigate how production subsidy and tariff will 
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affect the social utility. Differentiating (15) totally and 
noting that the aggregate certainty equivalent income is LI^, 
we get 
ds = L-dvy = L- (Vpdp + v,dr) 
= L- [- d(p)iyv,dp + Vidin = V, ( - gDdp + Ldl?) (17) 
where D = D(p,I*) is actual aggregate demand for the 
manufactured good. Using P = p + s = (p* + t) + s, dP = dt + 
ds and dp = dt given dp* = 0, the change in the aggregate 
certainty equivalent income can be written as 
Ldl? = d(rK + wL + tQ - sX) 
= K(9r/9p)dp + L(9w/ôp)dp + tdQ + Qdt - sX'dp - Xds. 
Using (5a) and (5b), we get 
Ldjy = [L(X/Kx) (k - ky)]dp + tdQ + Qdt - sX'dp - Xds 
= [ (XKy/KJ (1 - L/Ly) + D - sX'ldt 
+ [ (XKy/Kj (1 - L/Ly) - sX'lds + tdQ 
= [A + D - sX']dt + [A - sX'lds + tdQ, (18) 
where A s L(X/KJ (k - ky) - X = (XKy/Kj (1 - L/Ly) . Substituting 
(18) into (17) yields 
dS = V,(-0Ddp + Ldl?) 
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= Vi{[(l - d)B + A - sX']dt + [A - sX']ds + tdQ} (19) 
It is shown in the appendix that 
dQ = [l/(l-tDi)] { [EPp + DiY' - (l-pDi)X']dt 
+ [DjY' - (l-pD,)X']ds} (20) 
where is the slope of the compensated demand curve along a 
given indifference curve. Assume that both goods are normal 
(D| > 0 and C, = 1 - pD, > 0) . Then, 1 - tD, > 1 - pD, > 0. From 
(20), an increase in tariff or production subsidy shifts the 
import demand curve to the left, i.e., dQ/dt < 0 and dQ/ds < 
0. Moreover, 
dQ/ds - dQ/dt = - D//(l - tD,) > 0. (21) 
That is, a decrease in consumption tax (i.e., an increase in 
the production subsidy followed by an equal decrease in 
tariff) increases import demand. 
The first order conditions for optimal tariff and 
production subsidy can be derived from (19) and using dQ in 
(20) : 
dS/dt = (1 - 0)D + A - sX' + t(aQ/ôt) = 0, (22a) 
as / a s  =  (A  -  sx ' )  +  t ( aQ/a s )  =  o .  (22b )  
Substituting (22b) into (22a) yields t = (1 - 0)D/(aQ/as -
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9Q/9t). Using (21), we get the optimal tariff and production 
subsidy 
t = - (1 - 0)D/(0DD, + Dp) a 0, (23a) 
s = [A + t(aQ/as)]/X' < 0. (23b) 
If workers are risk neutral, then 6=1, and the optimal 
tariff is zero, but the optimal production subsidy reduces to 
A/X' < 0. Note that since the importable is a normal good, 
(0DD, + Dp) = Dp" + (6 - l)DD; < Dp" < 0. If workers are risk 
averse, then optimal tariff is positive. Since t > 0, (23b) 
implies that optimal production subsidy is negative. These 
results are summarized below: 
Proposition 1: If workers are risk neutral, then the optimal 
tariff is zero and optimal production subsidy on the 
importable is negative. If workers are risk averse, however, 
the optimal tariff is positive and the optimal production 
subsidy on the importable is negative. 
Note that a tariff can be broken down into a consumption 
tax and a production subsidy. Thus, if the optimal tariff and 
production subsidy are of the same magnitudes, then the 
optimal policy would be a net consumption tax. However, (23a) 
and (23b) indicate that no comparisons of the magnitudes of 
the tariff and the production subsidy can be made a priori. 
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Next, consider optimal tariff when no production subsidy is 
used. Then from (22a) the optimal tariff is 
t = - [(1 - 0)D + A]/(8Q/at). (24a) 
If workers are risk neutral, optimal tariff is negative, but 
if workers are risk averse, optimal tariff can be positive or 
negative, depending on the extent of risk aversion. 
On the other hand, if no tariff is used, then 
s = A/X' < 0. (24b) 
That is, regardless of risk attitudes, optimal production 
subsidy is negative when t = 0. 
When a positive tariff is used, optimal production subsidy is 
s = [A + tOQ/as)]/X' < 0. 
Proposition 2: If workers are risk averse, an import tariff 
can be welfare improving even when no production subsidy is 
used. If no import tariff is employed, optimal production 
subsidy is negative regardless of risk attitude. 
In the absence of a direct production subsidy, an import 
tariff can be broken down into a consumption tax and a 
production subsidy. Under risk aversion, a consumption tax 
enhances the social utility through a mechanism like that of 
insurance. A consumption tax can also be viewed as an income 
tax on the rich urban workers who are the main consumers of 
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imported goods. Part of this tax is then rebated to the poor. 
Therefore, an import tariff indirectly transfers income from 
the rich to the poor. Given that workers are risk averse, or, 
in other words, the individual indirect utilities are concave 
in income, such transfers increase the social welfare which is 
the sum of the utilities of all workers.' 
The following example illustrates the case of a positive 
tariff when no production subsidy is used. Suppose that, 
initially, with t = 0 (when there is free trade), W = 2w, 
which means P-MPL, = 2MPLy, or the labor productivity in the 
urban sector is twice as much as that in the rural sector. 
First, consider the case where workers are risk neutral. A 
simple algebraic manipulation leads to 13 = L^/(Lu + L*) = 1/2, 
or the urban employment rate is 50%. Suppose now a positive 
tariff (t > 0) is levied on imports and results in, say, W = 
3w, and hence jS = 1/3, which is to say that for every 3 
workers drawn from the rural sector by an even higher urban 
wage, 2 workers would be unemployed. Since P-MPL^ = 2MPLy 
still holds, there will be a production loss and a welfare 
loss. To see this, suppose a rural worker produces one unit 
while an urban worker produces two units. Before the tariff 
is levied, 3 workers produce 3 units in the rural sector; 
after the tariff, only 1 of them is employed in the urban 
sector, producing 2 units. 
If workers are risk averse, however, they will not accept i8 
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= 1/3 if a tariff results in the same wage relation as before, 
W = 3w. Recall that the Stolper-Samuelson-like result in 
Proposition 1 is independent of risk attitudes. Suppose that 
a higher rate of employment is required, say, jS = 2/3, for 
some level of risk aversion. In this case, out of every 3 
workers drawn from the rural sector, 2 will be employed in the 
urban sector, producing 2 units each, and obviously, there 
will be a gain in production because of the tariff. 
7. Concluding Remarks 
This paper investigated the properties of a generalized HT 
model with risk averse workers. It is assumed that the 
consumer-worker receives income from capital endowment and 
also from the sale of labor services, but labor income depends 
on whether and where the worker is employed. To focus on the 
welfare impacts of trade policies on LDCs, we assume that 
capital endowments are uniformly distributed among workers. 
Since labor is mobile between the urban and the rural sectors, 
risk averse workers insure that the flexible rural wage is 
equal to the certainty equivalent wage, which is less than the 
expected wage in the urban sector. 
We employ a social welfare function which gives equal 
weights to all workers. It is shown that maximizing social 
welfare is equivalent to maximizing the utility of the rural 
worker. Thus, any policy that raises the utility of a rural 
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worker (or the expected utility of an urban worker) raises 
social welfare. If workers are risk neutral, then a tariff 
necessarily hurts a small open economy, and hence the 
traditional HT model cannot explain the widespread use of 
tariffs in LDCs. We have shown, however, that if workers are 
risk averse and an optimal production subsidy is used, an 
import tariff necessarily improves the welfare of an HT 
economy. 
This model provides a possible explanation for the 
widespread use of production subsidies in the export sector 
and import tariffs in some developing countries. If workers 
are risk averse, an optimal policy consists of a negative 
production subsidy and a positive tariff. A negative 
production subsidy on the importable is equivalent to a 
production subsidy in the export sector. Our analysis shows 
that export promotion strategy alone is not optimal in an HT 
economy but it should be supplemented by an import tariff. 
This result is consistent with the policies of some LDCs such 
as South Korea and Taiwan. 
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Appendix 
With aggregate income I^, the import demand can be written 
as Q = D(p,lA) - X(P) , and, 
dQ = Dpdp + D,dl* - X'dP, (Al) 
where I* = rK + wLy + WL^ + tQ - sX = PX + Y + tQ - sX, 
dl'^ = PX'dP + XdP + Y'dP + tdQ + Qdt - sX'dP - X ds 
= (pX' + X + Y')dP + Qdt - Xds + tdQ. (A2) 
Substituting (A2) into (Al) yields, 
dQ = Dpdp + D,[(pX' + X + Y')dP + Qdt - Xds + tdQ] - X'dP 
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= Dpdt + [D,{pX' + D + Y') - X']dt 
+ [D,(pX' + Y') - X']ds + tD,dQ 
= [Dp + DD, + D,Y'- (1 - pD,)X']dt 
+ [D,Y'- (1 - pD,)X']ds + tD,dQ. 
Rearranging terms, we get (20). 
Endnotes 
We would like to thank Alan Deardorff for his helpful 
comments. The usual caveats apply. 
1. See also Choi and Beladi (1993) for optimal tariff policies 
for a small open economy with general unemployment risk. 
2. In Corden and Findlay (1975), production subsidies and 
import tariffs are considered separately, whereas this 
paper permits the government to use both instruments 
simultaneously. 
3. It is well known that the direct utility function U(') is 
concave if and only if the indirect utility function V(p,I) 
is concave in income. 
4. In addition to rebates of net government revenue, the total 
profits, 
n = PF + G - WLjj - rK* - wLy - rK;, 
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are also distributed to consumers as dividends, but they 
are equal to zero in equilibrium. 
5. 6 = (rk + w + tq)/(rk + WL^/L + wLy/L + tq) 
= (rk + w + tq)/(rk + (1 + X) (w + p)LiJl, + wLy/L + tq) 
= (rk + w + tq)/{rk + (w + p) (L - Ly)/L + wLy/L + tq) 
= (rk + w + tq)/(rk + w + tq + p (1 - Ly/L) ) 
= (rK + wL + tq)/(rK + wL + tq + p(Lx + LJ). 
6. In most countries, labor income is 3 - 4 times capital 
income. To get a reasonable estimate, assume that WL^ + wLy 
= 3rK. Let L = 1, and assume that Ly = .3, L^ = .6, and 
that urban wage is twice the rural wage, W = 2w. Then 
actual per capita income, r + WL^/L + wLy/L = 2w, whereas 
rural worker's income, equal to certainty equivalent income 
of the urban worker, rk + w = 1.5 w. In this case, 6 -
.75. 
7. The author is indebted to Dr. Harvey Lapan for the 
intuition provided here. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
The pioneering work on labor migration of John R. Harris 
and Michael P. Todaro in 1970 has generated such enormous 
interest and later contributions that it is impossible to 
discuss in the general terms the Harris-Todaro (HT) model in 
one Ph.D. dissertation. It is because of the versatility of 
the HT framework that it can be easily adopted to embrace 
debates on trade policies for an HT type economy. 
This dissertation consists three articles and deals with 
the topic of international trade policies of a small and open 
country with surplus labor in the context of the Harris-Todaro 
model. The basic structure is that of Corden and Findlay, 
whereupon necessary modifications are added to allow for the 
discussions on the effect of the presence of a service sector 
and risk averse workers. 
The essence of the results is that protectionist 
practices are welfare reducing for a two sector HT economy 
with risk neutral workers but maybe beneficial in the presence 
of a nontraded service sector or risk averse workers. More 
precisely, with a third sector, the nontraded service sector, 
that uses only labor as input, production subsidies to the 
import competing industry or import tariffs can be welfare 
improving. When workers are risk averse, the optimal police 
combination is a positive production subsidy and a positive 
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tariff. Thus, large amount of urban unemployment (or, 
underemployment as characterized in the service sector in this 
dissertation) and risk attitude of the workers can be used as 
justification (as the infant industry argument) for some LDCs' 
trade restraining practices. 
Possible extensions from this point include introducing 
dynamics into the present static model and empirical studies. 
It is only reasonable to assume that the process of 
migrating into a city and seeking urban employment is not a 
one-shot deal, instead, it involves continual adjustment of 
the perceived and actual probability of landing a profitable 
urban job, as well as the adjustment of the expectation of 
workers. Rational expectation may also be incorporated into 
the model so that workers maximize the discounted present 
value of their income stream over a certain period of time. 
Many of the analytic results can be tested statistically. 
For instance, the relationships between urban unemployment is 
predicted to fall if a higher tariff is levied on the 
importable. Both time series and cross country studies can be 
conducted to see how the prediction holds in the real world. 
